The ICANN87 meeting was expected to energise the ICANN community through swift, pain-free work on the DNS abuse PDP1 and the reveal of new gTLD string applications. Some of this energy was evident around. the DNS abuse PDP1), while other topics, such as the new gTLD round received limited community feedback. The discussions also revealed the gap in (the lack of) registrant recourse and redress mechanisms in abuse mitigation. In this blog, we explore some ICANN87 updates that will be of interest to the ccTLD community, whose direct and indirect involvement is becoming increasingly prominent in ICANN policy discussions.
New gTLD round
On 7 October, ICANN published the list of applications received in the new gTLD 2026 round, revealing the applied-for strings and applying entities. A final list of all the applied-for gTLD strings will be published on 17 November. The ICANN community and the general public will have an opportunity to provide feedback until 16 March 2027, in the form of comments, objections, and Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) early warnings.
During ICANN87, ICANN Org held multiple capacity-building and information sessions on the next steps in the new gTLD round to inform the community and, most importantly, GAC members, who have special mechanisms to raise concerns, including via early warnings, when an application is seen as potentially sensitive or problematic. However, only GAC Consensus Advice can potentially impact an application, provided that the ICANN Board accepts it.
GAC members noted that many applications are linked to government functions, public services, and regulated sectors, such as medicine, finance, education, and fundraising, and that additional safeguards would be required, particularly with regard to consumer protection and DNS abuse. Other community sessions focused on the procedural aspects of the round and provided little insight into reactions to the revealed strings.
Registrant verification
One of the most engaging conversations at ICANN87 was the GAC discussion on registration data issues, focusing on the need to verify registration data to tackle abuse. Under ICANN contracts, registrars have 15 days to validate and verify registrants' contact information. According to the GAC, this timeline needs swift review before new gTLD strings are delegated, and verification should occur before a newly registered domain becomes accessible via DNS. The GAC continues to insist on a clear correlation between pre-delegation verification requirements and a decrease in abuse, citing experiences from ccTLD space and regulated gTLDs. ICANN-contracted registrars continue to be sceptical of that pressure from the GAC, and insist on “further evidence from ccTLDs and other environments with more stringent requirements”. The INFERMAL study, concluded in 2024, indicates a 70% decrease in malicious registrations when validation of registrant information takes place during account creation or before domain purchase. However, the authors caution against making policy decisions based solely on the study's conclusions, as broader economic implications and impacts on legitimate users have to be considered.
The ccNSO representative pointed out that verification practices vary significantly across the ccTLD space. The lack of automated tools and the difficulty of accessing authoritative data from other databases and registers make verification costly and manual for smaller ccTLD registries.
European ccTLD experiences confirm that (diverse) registration data verification practices are only one part of the bigger picture of a safe zone. Low levels of abuse across European ccTLDs can be attributed to a combination of practices, including effective cooperation mechanisms with competent public authorities and broader educational efforts with local internet communities. Online abuse is a complex issue, and there is no silver bullet.
However, disputes over direct evidence linking low levels of abuse to registrant verification should not stop the ICANN community from reviewing its policies. As the INFERMAL study authors have called for, any policy change must consider additional factors, such as the impact on legitimate users. Setting a proportionate deadline for domain name holders to respond to verification requests, coupled with a risk-based approach that does not treat each domain name holder as a potential criminal, would be a good conversation starter and aligns with experiences in the European ccTLD space.
Redress & recourse mechanisms for registrants
Registrants and their rights are among the underrepresented interests in the ICANN community. This is why it is important to ensure that the ICANN community duly considers registrant rights and impact as it discusses public interest concerns in its policy work.
The topic of registrant redress and recourse came into the spotlight as the community renewed its attention to DNS abuse and sped up work on abuse-related policies. The latest development from ICANN87 is that the redress topic is moving to its own PDP, rather than being considered in the nascent DNS abuse PDP2 on bulk registrations. The Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG)-led sessions reminded the ICANN community that large-scale domain registrations do not always involve malicious actors and can be important for human rights defenders and activist groups trying to bypass censorship and rely on resilient internet infrastructure for their activities. For similar reasons, there is also the need for respect for registrant privacy and anonymity in certain cases.
A cross-community panel discussion on registrant recourse and redress mechanisms revealed a gap in ICANN policies: there is currently no due process obligation for any contracted party that suspends a domain name for DNS abuse under ICANN contracts. Contracted parties generally want to address abuse as soon as possible, but certain communication channels should be reserved for those registrants who believe a registry/registrar action has been applied erroneously. Contracted parties do not see the need for a contractual requirement to offer additional recourse avenues for registrants. However, clearer communication and customer support channels can improve the customer experience for registrants.
European ccTLD community experience was also brought into the spotlight during the session. Many European ccTLDs generally do not agree with ICANN’s definition of DNS abuse, as each case of alleged abuse involving a domain name should undergo its own proportionality and legitimacy assessment and, where necessary, involve input from a competent authority. Clear terms of service, transparent procedures, and the ability to object to decisions made without a competent authority’s involvement are minimum requirements for ensuring respect for registrant rights when acting against potentially abusive domain names.
Conclusion
ICANN87 discussions showed the need for a cross-community conversation on ICANN policy development, including sharing experiences and practices from the ccTLD community, which is not formally part of the policy development process. It also showed that experiences from different operators and underrepresented groups enrich the conversation and debunk certain preconceptions.